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TAIWAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970s: A CASE
STUDY OF ADAPTATION AND VIABILITY*
THOMAS

J.

BELLOWS**

A series of diplomatic-political setbacks in the early 1970s
suggested that Taiwan - i.e., the Republic of China (ROC) would progressively suffer political isolation. The political
isolation would lead to economic and cultural isolation, and the
viability and independent status of Taiwan would draw to a close.
A nadir of sorts occurred when the ROC walked out of the U.N.
General Assembly on October 25, 1971. A motion to declare the
expulsion of Taiwan an "important question," requiring a twothirds vote, failed by a four vote margin (55 to 59, 15 abstentions).
Taiwan's position was not helped by the fact that Henry
Kissinger, then Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, was on his second visit to Peking at the time the General
Assembly debated the China question. Immediately after the vote,
the ROC Foreign Minister, Chou Shu-kai, announced that his
government "would not take part in any further proceedings of
the General Assembly." Since the admission of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) to the United Nations, there have been
efforts to relegate the ROC to the status of a non-country. It is no
longer included in any U.N. statistical reports. The most visible
reminder of the ROC's earlier membership, a marble plaque
carrying a quotation from Confucius that was a gift of the ROC,
was quietly removed in August 1972. A New York Times editorial
pointedly assessed the practical absurdity of such actions:
An international statistical summary that ignores this
living reality is diminished in its authority - and so is the
agency that issues it. But the U.N. authorities have even
stooped to the Communist device of trying to rewrite history.
At U.N. headquarters here, a plaque identifying the Republic
of China as donor has been removed. . . . Such petty
manipulation cannot erase the substantial contributions of
the Republic of China to a quarter-century of U.N. history. 1

* Originally published in Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No.7 (July 1976). Reprinted
with minor revisions with the permission of the author and the University of
California Press.
** Professor and Chairman of Political Science Department at the University
of Arkansas, Fayetteville.
1. New York Times, August 10, 1972.
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Potential isolation had threatened two decades earlier. Mter
the start of the Korean War, the ROC was extricated from a
situat1on in which it appeared that the U.S. was preparing to
accept a Communist seizure of Taiwan. President Truman made a
statement in January 1950, which partly foreshadowed the
Shanghai communique 22 years later, declaring that Taiwan was
a part of China and that the U.S. would not provide military
assistance to the Nationalists of Taiwan. 2
Subsequent reversal of this position and renewed American
commitments to Taiwan began with the Korean War. By 1971,
however, it was obvious that the United States had set into
motion a process of accommodations vis-a-vis the PRC. This was
manifestly symbolized by the two Kissinger trips to China and the
July 15 announcement that President Nixon would soon visit the
PRC. The Shanghai Joint Communique of February 27, 1972,
reaffirmed what both the ROC and the PRC maintain, that
Taiwan is a part of China. Some have interpreted the American
statement in the communique as evidence that American
commitment to Taiwan was drawing to a close:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one
China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States
Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by
the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it
affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military
installations on Taiwan as the tension diminishes. 3
The American position was amplified at a news conference in
Shanghai the same day when Henry Kissinger told reporters that
American defense obligations under the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty remained unchanged. 4 •
Subsequent actions decreased the American military presence
in Taiwan, but not in a way meant to indicate that diplomatic
abandonment was imminent. The number of American military
personnel has been reduced to 900, less than one-quarter the
2. Harry S. Truman, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, 1950
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 11.
3. Department of State Bulletin, LXVI:1708 (March 20, 1972), pp. 437-438.
4. Ibid., p. 428.
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number stationed there in mid-1963 prior to the Vietnam buildup.
U.S. military advisers were withdrawn from Kinmen (Quemoy)
and Matsu in mid-1976. 4 a Two squadrons of F-4 Phantom jet
fighters were removed, one to the Philippines in the summer of
1974, while the other was withdrawn in May 1975. 5 These
squadrons had been stationed in Taiwan in January 1973, to
replace 48 F -5A fighters that Taiwan had loaned to South
Vietnam. American interest in Taiwan's air defense continues,
however. The ROC has entered into a joint production arrangement with the Northrup Corporation to construct 100 F-5E
"Tiger" fighters at a cost of $2 million each. The U.S. has
extended over $150 million in credits through 1978 for construction of these interceptors at a plant near the city of Taichung. 6
The first F-5E fighter rolled off the assembly line on October 30,
1974, the late President Chiang Kai-shek's birthday.
ROC officials are extremely sensitive about any U.S. government action which suggests a diminishing interest in Taiwan. For
example, following the death of President Chiang Kai-shek on
April 5, 1975, discussions within the American government and
between the U.S. and Taiwan governments continued for a week
over the stature of the U.S. delegation that would attend President
Chiang's funeral. Domestic political pressures and the ROC's
intense concern culminated in the naming of Vice-President
Rockefeller to head the U.S. delegation.
There was displeasure in Taipei with the October 1974
Congressional repeal of the Formosa Resolution. This resolution
had been approved on January 29, 1955, at a time when Quemoy
(the largest island in the Kinmen complex) and the Matsu Islands
were under heavy daily bombardment from the mainland, and
eight weeks after the signing of the Mutual Defense Security
Treaty between the U.S. and the ROC on December 2, 1954. The
Formosa Resolution made it the President's responsibility to
4a. News from China, June 25, 1976.
5. The withdrawal was based on an "understanding" reached between
Taiwan and the U.S. in November 1972. No State Department announcement was
made at the time of the May withdrawal, although a few press reports appeared in
June quoting State Department sources. As of December 31, 1975, there were 2,000
American military personnel in Taiwan, 135 American civilian direct hire, and 992
foreign national direct hire.
6. The F -5E Tiger II is a single accommodation interceptor. It is designed to
be used against the MIG-17, -19, and -21. The Almanac of World Military Power
reports that figures available as of mid-1974 show that the PRC had 1,000 MIG-19
fighters, 1,500 MIG-15/17 fighters and 300 MIG-21/F-9 interceptors. All PRC
bombers are outclassed by the Tiger II.
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determine if an attack on Quemoy or Matsu was related to the
defense of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands (or Pescadores) and to
respond accordingly. Congress thus endorsed the President's
power to use American forces to resist an attack on Quemoy and
Matsu under certain circumstances. The repeal of this resolution,
however, did not change basic American commitments under the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The key article in the treaty is
Article V which states that an attack in the West Pacific area
against the territories of either the U.S. or the ROC is considered
dangerous. Such an attack requires each country to "act to meet
the common defense in accordance with its constitutional
processes." The territorial focus of the treaty is Taiwan and the
Penghu Islands. Quemoy or Matsu are not disregarded, however,
because Article VI refers to "such other territories as may be
defined by mutual agreement." 7
Both American and ROC officials are quick to point out that
the repeal of the Formosa Resolution did not jeopardize American
defense commitments to Taiwan. The cornerstone from Taiwan's
point of view is the 1954 treaty. If this should be modified in any
way by President Ford, substantial foreign policy adjustments
might have to be made in Taipei. Despite the 1971 and subsequent
diplomatic setbacks, the diplomatic status of the ROC remains
viable as of early 1976.
The impact of earlier diplomatic trends which were quite
discouraging in 1970 and 1971 has been modified. The stabilizing
of the ROC's overall position results primarily from the flexibility
and initiative shown by government officials in Taipei. Taiwan
faced the distinct possibility of becoming the orphan of Asia, if
not a world orphan. The trend toward derecognition first appeared
in 1970 when the PRC returned to the diplomatic world scene and
began actively seeking out diplomatic ties after the 1S69 Ninth
Party Congress (see Table 1). Recognition of the PRC accelerated
with its admission to the United Nations (see Table 2). There were
fewer recognitions in 1973, but the pace quickened in 1974, and
included important countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The challenge of diplomatic isolation continues with the Philippine recognition of the PRC in June and Thai recognition on July
1, 1975. This article analyzes the ROC's strategy for survival. The
ROC's viability might have been totally undermined as formal
7. For background on American treaty commitments to the ROC, see U.S.
Senate, Committee on Foregin Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Vol. I, Parts 1-4,
91st Congress, 2d Sess., 1971, pp. 927-931.
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political support and participation at the international level
eroded, but it has not.
Table 1. Countries Recognizing the PRC between
January 1, 1970 and October 24, 1971

------------------------------------------------------10/13170
Canada*
Equatorial Guinea
Italy*
Ethopia
Chile*
Nigeria
Cameroon*
Kuwait*
San Marino
Austria
Sierra Leone*
Turkey*
Iran*

10/15170
1U06/70
11121/70
01115/71
02/10/71
03/26171
03/27171
0.'5/06 '71
05/2ll!71
07/29/71
08/05/71
08/17171

* Countries previously recognizing Republic of China.

Unchanging Principles and Changing Strategy
The selection of President Chiang's eldest son, Chiang Chingkuo, as Premier on May 16, 1972, signified important changes in
the Taipei polictical scene. Within a few days, the popular Foreign
Minister, Chou Shu-kai, was replaced by Shen Chang-huan.
Ambassador Shen had served as Foreign Minister between 1960
and 1966 and immediately prior to his appointment was
Ambassador to Thailand. A more cautious individual, he was less
given to public comments. The new Foreign Minister at one time
was the late President Chiang's interpreter and apparently is
close to Madam Chiang.
For some time stories had been circulating that Taiwan was
engaging in formal discussions with the Soviet Union and might
expand relations to fill a vacuum should the Americans withdraw.
On at least two occasions, an "unofficial" Soviet representative
visited Taiwan. Former American ambassador to Taiwan, Walter
P. McConaughy, has publicly stated that in 1969 "a Soviet
correspondent was allowed to visit Taiwan."H Soviet correspondent and reputed KGB agent, Victor Louis, visited Taiwan in
November 1971, and had informal talks with Foreign Minister
8. Ibid.
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Table 2. Countries Recognizing the People's Republic of China
since October 24, 1971 (listed chronologically)
Belgium*
Bhutan
Peru*
Ecuador*
Lebanon*
Rwanda*
Iceland
Cyprus*
Malta*
Mexico*
Argentina*
Bahrain
Greece*
Guyana
Japan*
West Germany
Maldives*
Gabon*
Malagasy Republic*
Luxembourg*
Jamaica*
Zaire*

10/25/71
10/25/71
11/02171
11/09/71**
11/09/71
11/12/71
12/14171
12/14/71
01131172
02/14172
02/19172
04/10172
06/05172
06/27172
09/29172
10/11/72
10/14172
10/16172
11/06172
11/16172
11/21172
11/24172

Chad*
Australia*
New Zealand*
Spain*
Upper Volta*
Guinea Bissau
Botswana*
Malaysia
Trinidad and Tobago*
Venezuela*
Niger*
Brazil*
Grenada
Gambia*
Portugal*
Philippines*
Thailand*
Bangladesh
Fiji
Comoro Islands
Western Samoa*
Cape Verde Islands
Central African
Empire*
Barbados*

11/28172
12/22172
12/22172
03/07173
09/15173
09/30173
03/25174
05/31174
06/20/74
06/28174
07/16174
08/15174
10/10174
12/17174
01106175
06/09175
07/01175
10/01175
11/05175
11115175
11/13175
04/25176
08/25/76
01111177**

* Countries previously recognizing Republic of China.
** Date of severing relations with the ROC.

Chou. 9 Chou may have played a role in arranging for these visits
and informally supported such contacts when talking to correspondents. Chou's replacement by· Shen in 1972 was partly
interpreted as a rejection of such policies at that time. 10 There also
were rumors and speculations that Taipei might enter into
unofficial discussions with PRC officials. In order to end these
speculations, Premier Chiang outlined four "unchangeable principles" of foreign policy to the Legislative Yuan on September 29,
9. The Far Eastern Economic Review, 88:26 (June 27, 1975), p. 5, correctly
reported that Victor Louis visited Taiwan again in December 1974 for top-level
meeting with Nationalist leaders.
10. In a recent, far-ranging and often critical analysis of America's domestic
and international condition, Madame Chiang Kai-shek attacked detente between
the U.S. and the PRC, but in the case of U.S. Soviet relations observed: "With the
present mature and reasoned leadership in the Kremlin, detente embodies the
necessary goodwill to build upon." Madame Chiang Kai-shek, "We do beschrei it,"
Free China Review, XXV:5 (May 1975), p. 22.
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1972. The unequivocally anti-Communist principles included
"national recovery" of the mainland. 11 The hard line in practice is
implemented through a pragmatic strategy of survival and
growth: 1) strengthen existing diplomatic relations; 2) encourage.
foreign trade and foreign investment in Taiwan; and 3) "all out"
diplomacy which stresses economic, technical, cultural and
educational interaction with selected countries, regardless of
whether or not the country officially recognizes the ROC.

Economic Conditioners. A major factor in the ROC's
survival is its economic position and emphasis on international
trade. Taiwan is in the highest decile of countries when
calculating the percentage of GNP exported. Through 1974, as
Table 3 shows, the role of foreign trade in its economy has grown
remarkably. Significant modifications in the interdependence of
the ROC and the world economy would require a major
reorientation of Taiwan's entire economic structure.
A brief review of the ROC's economy reveals a shift between
1952 and 1974 from a principally agricultural country to
diversified agriculture and industry with emphasis on foreign
trade. Total foreign trade in 1952 was $303 million, while in 1975
the total was $11.254 billion 12 (all dollar amounts in this article
are U.S. dollars). Sugar and rice alone accounted for 80% of the
exports in 1952, while agricultural products and processed
agricultural products together constituted 95% of 1952 exports.
During 1975, industrial products accounted for 83.6% of the
exports, processed agricultural products were 10.8% of the total
and agricultural products constituted 5.6%. 13
Taiwan's economic progress since 1952 is an example which
other countries might well review. Taiwan has: (1) stressed labor
intensive industry; (2) labor intensive agriculture; (3) geographically dispersed industry; and (4) tied agricultural development in
with industrial development, one manifestation being the emer11. Two of the four principles clearly implied that the ROC would not become
the Republic of Taiwan, and it would not cooperate with the Soviet Union. The four
principles are reproduced in Republic of China, China Yearbook: 1972-1973
(Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1973), p. 9.
12. Economic Planning Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data
Book, 1974, p. 168; and China Post, January 9, 1976.
13. Percentages were obtained from K. T. Li and W. A Yeh, Public Policy and
Economic Development on Taiwan (Taipei: Council for International Economic
Cooperation and Development, April 1969), p. 4; and Free China Weekly, XVII:4
January 25, 1976), p. 1.
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Table 3. Percentage of GNP Expected
ROC
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967

ROC
8.5
6.3
8.6
11.1
16.9
17.9

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Comparison - 1973
27.1
33.0
40.8
47.8
39.8
35.1

U.S.A.
Japan
France
United Kingdom
West Germany
Canada

5.4
8.9
14.3
17.5
19.3
21.2

Sources: Percentages for ROC derived from data in Economic Planning
Council, Executive Yuan, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1974 (Taipei: Republic of
China, June, 1974); the China Post, January 15 and February 18, 1975; Republic of
China, Weekly Newsletter, No. 139, (January 27, 1976), p. 3; and Free China
Weekly, XVII:3 (January 18, 1976), p. 4. Percentages for the comparison were taken
from United States-Japan Trade Council. A Comparison of Selected Economic
Data (Washington, D.C.: United States-Japan Trade Council, 1975).

gence of a substantial agri-industrial system. 14 Taiwan is a
prototype of agricultural, industrial, market and export developments complementing one another and advancing together. The
export thrust is significant because it has involved so many
aspects of the economic system and hence has brought benefits to
most elements of the population.

Strengthening Official Interactions. During the 1970s,
· ·---the ROC had emphasized strengthening diplomatic ties, cultural
and educational exchanges, and commercial relations such as
trade and foreign investment, the latter not completely controlled
by the official foreign policy institutions. This section analyzes
those parts of Taiwan's global interactions which are entirely
government controlled. The trend of official diplomatic relations
has not favored Taiwan. Between 1963 and mid-1975, countries
formally recognizing the ROC dropped from 66 to 26 while the
number recognizing the PRC went from 50 to 112. In 1976, the
ROC lost the Central African Empire (formerly a Republic) and
Cape Verde Islands, but elevated its consulate-general to embassy
status with the Republic of South Mrica. In addition, ROC lost
Barbados at the beginning of 1977.
14. In 1963, for example, processed agricultural exports totaled $149 million
and in 1974 the total was $592 million. Dollar amounts taken from Board of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Foreign Trade Development in the
Republic of China, p. 16; and China Post, January 15, 1975.

CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES

9

It is difficult to stop the current world trend toward
recognition of Peking, but Taipei is making great efforts to
reinforce existing relations and stabilize the number of countries
recognizing the ROC. This is a difficult objective. President
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines visited the PRC in June
1975, and announced from Peking that as ofthat date diplomatic
relations were established between the two countries. The joint
communique stressed non-interference in each other's internal
affairs. A trade agreement was signed the same day. Taipei
worked diligently between Mrs. Marcos' ten-day visit to the PRC
in September 1974 and the June announcement to dissuade the
Philippines from recognizing Peking since ROC officials were
convinced, correctly so, that Thailand would recognize Peking
within a few days of the Philippine recognition. Thai recognition
occurred on July 1, 1975, during a visit by Prime Minister Kukrit
to Peking. Singapore may then, as its own leaders have predicted,
be the last ASEAN nation to establish diplomatic relatiom with
the PRC.
Continued American recognition is important if a respectable
modicum of official diplomatic relationships is to be maintained.
Premier Chiang recently enunciated what he regarded as the first
practical objective of Taiwan's foreign policy: "We shall do our
utmost to maintain bilateral relations with friendly countries and
especially to strengthen our alliance with the U.S." 15
Taiwan opened two new consulates in the U.S. during 1973-74
(Atlanta and Kansas City) and reactivated the consulate in
Portland. These offices publicize the ROC's political position and
facilitate the expansion of commercial ties between the two
countries. Official ROC policy for well over a year has been that
Taiwan's favorable balance of trade with the U.S. should be
reduced, and an effort is being made to import more American
goods. In some cases importers are encouraged to place orders
with American firms, even though Japanese or other countries of
origin goods might be less expensive.
Trade also follows and stabilizes the diplomatic flag in other
cases. The past year has witnessed considerable exchanges of
dignitaries between Taiwan and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Central American countries recognizing the ROC, as well as
efforts to expand trade with these friendly countries. Foreign
assistance is also used to strengthen ties, though in the case of a
15. Free China Review, XXIV:10 (October 1974), p. 16. This strategy was
reiterated to the author in conversations he had with government officials in
Taipei.
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donor nation such as Taiwan these must be selective and not
require massive expenditures.
The first major technical assistance effort which proved
politically successful began in the 1960s. This effort was
stimulated by the 1960 U.N. General Assembly vote when the
ROC lost two votes, dropping to 42, while the PRC gained five, up
to 34. A diplomatic campaign began, with emphasis on Africa.
During 1960, 17 states were admitted to U.N. membership, 16 of
them in Africa. Between 1960-62, 23 African countries gained
independence. Thirteen recognized the ROC; five recognized the
PRC; and five recognized neither. Eight African nations which
abstained on the U.N. China vote in 1961 voted against the PRC
in 1962. At the time the Cultural Revolution drew to a close in
mainland China in 1969, the ROC had diplomatic relations with
24 African countries. In part, this was a result of the PRC's
diplomatic ineptitude of the 1960s. It was also a consequence of
Taiwan's export of an "agricultural revolution" to parts of Africa.
This was not a case of aid leading to subversion, but aid, among
other objectives, sustaining needed diplomatic support.
During the 1960s and through 1971, one political payoff of
these missions was the support African nations gave the ROC.
Another story was the incessant and relatively successful push of
the PRC's "smiling diplomacy" during the 1970's to reduce the
number of countries recognizing Taiwan in Africa and Latin
America. Table 4 summarizes the ROC's exchange missions
which remain important in maintaining a small nucleus of
recognition for the ROC in Africa and Latin America.
Table 4. Number of ROC Personnel Participating Annually in
Overseas Technical Missions (Unit: 1 person)

Africa
Latin America
Other

1961

1964

1967

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

15

121
6
96

518
22
100

702
48
63

738
23
40

721
52
49

479
82
60

255
103
51

204
120
7

29

Sources: Secretariat, Committee of International Technical Cooperation,
International Technical Cooperation (Taipei: Committee of Intemational Techni·
cal Cooperation, 1974), pp. 2-3 and Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1976, pp. 232-233.
Missions go almost exclusively to countries recognizing the ROC.

Selected technical assistance, then, is an important aspect of
Taiwan's overall diplomatic effort. Because a majority of the
countries recognizing the ROC are small, developing countries, a

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES

11

nation such as the ROC can have some economic and political
impact, despite the inherent fiscal limitations on its efforts. A
dependable albeit small base of countries will provide the
minimum necessary for international legitimacy. Taiwan continues to hold memberships in at least 15 international organizations, including the Asian Development Bank, IMF, World Bank,
and the International Development Association. Without a
nucleus of formal recognition, official participation in international organizations would be rather difficult unless an official to
China recognition policy was followed by several countries and
was tolerated by both the ROC and the PRC. Despite adverse
circumstances, Taiwan's diplomatic policies have been surprisingly successful.

Trade and Investment
International trade and investment have been important in
the development of Taiwan's economy. They also are influential
in maintaining ties with countries recognizing the ROC and
facilitating interaction with countries which do not recognize
Taiwan. This section seeks to show how Taiwan's visibility and
sovereignty are relevant to various private groups and organizations throughout the world. Wide trade contacts and substantial
international investment should help to convince nongovernmental groups and also governments that useful purposes
are served if Taiwan maintains its sovereignty.
Trade. Table 3 indicated the predominant position of
foreign trade in Taiwan's economy, and suggested this degree of
dependence was among the highest in the world. Recent increases
are phenomenal. The spectacular increases began in 1970 when
total trade was $2,952 billion as compared to $12,620 billion in
1974, $11,254 billion in 1975, and $15.67 billion in 1976.15b
The expansion of foreign trade has not been without its
problems. The largest trade deficit ever recorded, $1,356 billion,
occurred in 1974. The ROC is limited in the restrictions it can
impose on imports, though in part as a result of a drop in total
trade, the 1975 deficit was reduced to $611 million. The 1976
surplus was $490 million. 15 b
During the last two decades consumer goods have averaged
only 5.5% of imports; the remainder were either capital equipment
15a. Free China Weekly, December 31, 1976, p. 1.
15b. Ibid., January 10, 1977, p. 1.
16. China Post, January 18, 1976.
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(31.7% in 1975) or agricultural and industrial raw materials (61.6%
in 1975). 16 Furthermore, Taiwan, at least initially, has been
vulnerable to the multitudinous international inflation recession
pressures. The actual economic growth rate in 1974 was 0.6%, the
lowest since 1952 when economic development began, 17 but by
1975 it was 2.8% and in 1976 it was 11.5%.178 Importation of
petroleum products increased by only 10% in 1974, but import
costs went up $400 million, or 133%. 1 8
There also are positive indicators in the Taiwan economy
which should not be disregarded. Both the wholesale and urban
consumer price indexes dropped in January 1975, when compared
to December 1974. The budget surplus for the 1974 fiscal year was
$399.5 million, bring the total cumulative surplus to $963.2
million. Foreign exchange reserves actually increased by 5.5%
between January 31, 1974, and January 31, 1975. 19 The ExportImport Bank committed a $500 million loan in January for
purposes related to the "Ten Basic Projects" referred to below.
During January/February 1975, two American banks loaned $800
million for major construction projects. The level of official and
private American financial commitment is high. 20
Despite these positive signs, discussions the author had with
ROC officials suggested that a more inward looking attitude
toward development is emerging. This is supported by occasional
public statements such as Premier Chiang's statement that
Taiwan's "economy cannot depend wholly on exports and our
domestic market is yet to be developed." 21 The combining of
various construction programs into the "Ten Basic Projects" and
the determination to go ahead despite rising costs, is an
acknowledgement that Taiwan's economic infrastructure needs
updating, not only to facilitate foreign trade programs but to
provide the necessary basis for expanding domestic economy. The
expansion of heavy industry which parallels the "Ten Basic
Projects" will reduce the need to import capital goods (31.7% of
17. Ibid., February 6, 1975.
17a. China Daily News, December 31, 1976, p. 1.
18. Ibid., January 3, 1975.
19. Data supplied by the Department of State.
20. Support for the ROC by the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. has been
exceptional. Cumulative support from its inception in 1934 through June 30, 1974,
excluding the recent loan, was $1.683 billion. Only three developing countries
received more from Eximbank during this period - Brazil, Mexico, and Iran. The
total loaned to Asia for this period was $13.337 billion. Export-Import Bank of the
United States, Cumulative Records (Washington: Eximbank, 1975), pp. 36-90.
21. Free China Review, XXIV:10 (October 1974), p. 20.
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imports in 1975) and will enable Taiwan to supply a greater share
of its own industrial needs. It also can better compete in terms of
exporting a larger percentage of capital intensive, more technologically sophisticated goods.
Foreign trade will not be deemphasized, but there is growing
recognition that the domestic market can be better developed so
that national well-being should not completely depend on foreign
trade. A certain caution and critical review of the international
economic situation is apparent. Once reason for this concern was
observed by the author when he recently visited the Nantze
Export Processing Zone in Kaohsiung. One of the few American
owned companies operating in this particular EPZ manufactures
and exports Indian motorcycles for the American market. Output
was 1500 units per month, half the plant's capacity. The necessity
of foreign trade is obvious, but there are the now obvious dangers
of fluctuating markets, layoffs, and economic turndown. There is
a new realism, and a manifestation of new and cautious attitudes
about the role of foreign trade as the ultimate and immutable
underpining of Taiwan's domestic and international positions.
Taipei is also attempting to diversify its trade and reduce its
dependence on a few countries. There has been diversification in
terms of dollar amounts, but in percentage distribution the data is
less encouraging as shown in Table 5. In 1952, Japan and the
United States provided 67% of Taiwan's imports (the former 44.7%
and the latter 22.2%) and took 56% of its exports (52.6% to Japan
and 3.5% to the U.S.). 22 The percentage share between Japan and
the U.S. had adjusted over the years, but the excessive percentage
concentration on the two countries remains. Trade with Europe is
increasing, but total trade with Asian countries other than Japan
continues to drop because of the percentage decline in exports.
The government has had some success in encouraging the
direction of trade. Taiwan ranked 16th in countries exporting to
the U.S. in 1974 and was lOth in terms of purchasing American
goods. 2 ~ During the past 30 months considerable effort has been
expended on increasing American imports and reducing Taiwan's
favorable trade balance. The China Post has noted that in 1973
and 1974 the ROC was America's 12th largest trading partner in a
field of 145. This newspaper, which reflects the government's
views in fl -~ ign affairs, predicts that Taiwan will rank 7th by
22. Industry of Free China, XIX:6 (June 1963), pp. 110.115.
23. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974,
96th edition (Washington: GPO, 1975).
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Table 5. ROC's Major Trading Areas by Percentage of Total
Exports/Imports

1963
1966
1969
1972
1973
1974
1975

U.S.A.

Japan

16.4
21.8
38.0
41.8
37.4
36.1
34.3

31.7
24.0
15.0
12.3
18.4
15.0
13.2

Exports
Europe
Asia*
8.6
9.7
9.9
11.3
12.9
14.6
15.0

31.2
32.8
32.2
17.5
15.8
20.0
23.1

U.S.A.
41.7
26.7
24.1
21.6
25.1
24.1
27.8

Imports
Japan
Europe Asia*
29.7
10.4
44.2
11.5
37.6
31.8
30.4

7.2
8.8
9.7
9.1
12.3
14.6
12.6

7.5
7.9
9.1
11.3
11.3
22.7
21.2

Sources: (1) Taiwan statistical data book 1976, pp. 184-193 and (2) Board of
Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economical Affairs, Foreign Trade Development in the
Republic of China (Taipei: China Art Printing Works, 1974). pp. 22-27.
* Other than Japan.

1976. 24 Diversification or reorientation of trade sometimes can
complement or facilitate political objectives. 25
Taiwan does, however, face difficulties in its U.S. trade in
addition to the current state of the American economy. The global
recession has generally taken a heavy toll on textiles and
electronics, and these are two of its principal industrial exports.
Furthermore, Taiwan must compete against Hong Kong and
South Korea, who also export heavily to the U.S. and who have
been among the world's leading countries in building an industroexport program. Despite those handicaps, Taipeh sees a paramount need to strengthen its trade relations with the United
States.
Taiwan's second most important trading partner is Japan,
but there are serious difficulties here as well. Taiwan's trade
deficit with Japan was $1.336 billion in 1974, just $20 million less
than its entire trade deficit. The Board of Foreign Trade decided in
the fall of 1974 to license certain imports from Japan and limit the
importation of Japanese spare parts. During 1974 the Board
imposed restrictions on 700 Japanese commodities and in January
1975 the sourcing of 104 "non-essentials" was limited to the U.S.
24. See, for example, China Post editorials of March 19, 1974, and February 20,
1975.
25. The PRC is even more obvious in its use of trade to achieve political
objectives. A recent news story reported that the PRC sold 75,000 tons of high
speed diesel fuel to Thailand at the "friendship" price of 93 cents per ton, $12
cheaper than the world market price! Bank of America, Asia Representative Office,
China Spotlight, 2:5 (May 1975), p. 4.
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and Europe. These restrictions have produced only limited results.
The trade deficit with Japan in 1975 was $1.101 billion, a drop of
$235 million compared to 1974 but nearly double Taiwan's overall
1975 deficit of $611 million. 26 The trade deficit with Japan 1976
was roughly estimated to be the 1974 figure. 26 a
Juxtaposed against the trade imbalance is the competitive
advantage many Japanese goods have and the long-standing
trade relationships which are difficult to realign. One economist
has concluded that during the 1970s, 72 to 86% of Japanese
exports will be heavy industrial goods. 27 One reason Taiwan
imports so much from Japan is its industrial surge. It is difficult
to forego these Japanese purchases if quality is competitive and
prices are lower. Proximity is also a contributing factor. Earlier
Japanese rule of Taiwan and postwar trade patterns have
reinforced ROC/Japanese commercial relations. 28

International Investment. International investment provides needed economic input, technical skills, and marketing
networks. It also is a reason for many private groups to have a
special interest in Taiwan's independent status. External investments from 1952 through 1975 totaled $1.405 billion. 29 Overseas
Chinese provided 29.2% of the total figure, with the balance
officially classified by the ROC as "foreign investment." Twothirds of the external investment, 67.4%, has come into Taiwan
since 1969. Nearly one-third of the aggregate external investment
($446 million) has come from the U.S., 23.5% more than the
overseas Chinese total ($361 million). External investment in 1975
was slightly over $118 million with $70.9 million classified as
foreign investment and $47.2 million from overseas Chinese
sources. American investors provided 58% of the total 1975
"foreign investment" and the Japanese share in 1975 dropped
26. Republic of China, Weekly Newsletter No. 139, January 27, 1976.
26a. China Daily News, January 6, 1977, p. 1.
27. Donald R. Sherk, "Post-Vietnam Asia: Trade and Investment Trends in the
Pacific," Pacific Community, V:2 (January 1974), p. 245.
28. Japan is anxious to augment the level of commercial transactions between
the two countries. In a major foreign policy statement before the Diet on January
24, 1975, Foreig. 'vtinister Miyazawa noted that "There will be no change in our
policy of maintaining business-like relations with Taiwan," Japan Report, XXI:5
(March 1, 1975, Special Supplement), p. 2.
29. Georgie Wang and Margaret Han (eds.), Free China Today (Taipei: Epoch
Publicity Agency, 1974), p. 109; and China Post, January 13, 1975 and January 12,
1976.
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sharply to 19.7% as compared to 35.7% in 1974. External
investment in 1976 was 150 million, 27% above 1975. 29 a
External investment reveals two immediate problems. First is
the impact of the international economy. Taiwan's incoming
investments during 1974 showed an increase of 4.13% over the
same period in 1973. 30 But by the end of 1974, incoming
investment was 23.9% below 1973, although 1974 was the second
highest year ever recorded. There was another sharp decline of
37.6% in 1975, although the total 1975 investment of $118,175.000
was still a respectable sum given the global economic situation. A
sustained decline in external investment could, however, have
negative political as well as economic implications.
A second, at least potential problem has been the substantial
level of Japanese investment. The author's discussions on Taiwan
indicated that while ROC/Japanese trade patterns need adjusting, there were no overt or covert efforts to discourage Japanese
investment. Other than an outright limitation on Japanese
investments, which the ROC cannot afford, there may be no
alternative other than substantial Japanese investment balanced
by diversification and increasing dollar investments from other
countries. One economist concludes that overseas Japanese
investment is shifting to labor intensive, lower-wage industries
because of the rapidly rising Japanese wage scales. Therefore, we
are entering a new era of Japanese foreign investment31 which
will maintain the attractiveness of Taiwan. There are inherent
limitations which preclude any major modification of ROC/ Japanese commercial relations.
International investment facilitates ROC's domestic economic
development as well as builds the distribution and marketing ties
that a trading nation like Taiwan requires. Such investment also
manifests political commitment and confidence by private groups
which will contribute to the future political survival of the ROC.

ROC Relation§hips With Countries Not Having
Diplomatic Ties
ROC government officials regularly point out that Taipei has
economic, cultural, and educational ties with over 110 countries.
Premier Chiang not long ago reaffirmed ROC's intentions "to
29a. China Daily News, January 1, 1977, p. 2.
30. Asia Research Bulletin, IV:5, Part 3 (October 31, 1974), p. 20.
31. Donald R. Sherk, "Post-Vietnam Asia" (supra note 27), p. 249.
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maintain relations with friendly countries." He did not limit
friendly countries to those that had not recognized the PRC, but
said: "more than a hundred countries continue to maintain
economic, trade and cultural relations with us. We shall never
permit the Communists to succeed in their sinister designs to
isolate us. ":12
Dating back to 1971, Taiwan adopted a more flexible foreign
policy. One unusual example is the Libyan Arab Republic.
Although Libya recognized the PRC in June 1971, ambassadors
were never exchanged, and the ROC embassy in Tripoli remains
open. Taiwan also reacts less immediately when a country
recognizes the PRC. Gambia, for example, recognized the PRC on
December 12, 1974, but it was not until December 28 that Taipei
formally announced that it would suspend its diplomatic relations
with Gambia. During the intervening two weeks it was possible
for the ROC embassy to effect other unofficial ties which would
not sever all contact between the two nations. The breaking of
diplomatic ties does not mean the end of all substantive ties. In
fact, as the following examples show, unofficial transactions may
grow.
A rank-ordering of Taiwan's top ten trading partners in 1973
- U.S.A., Japan, West Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Netherlands (ranging from $2.63 billion to $131 million total trade) reveals that only one among the "top ten," the United States,
maintains formal diplomatic relations with Taipei. West Germany, for example, recognized the PRC in October 1972, yet this
did not curtail ROC/West German interaction. West Germany is
Taiwan's leading European trading partner. Trade between the
two countries tripled between 1972 and 1975, with a trade total of
$690 million in 1975, and Germany enjoying a favorable balance
of $55.4 million. Scholarships were exchanged between the two
countries in 1973, and 300 nurses recruited from Taiwan are
serving in German hospitals.aa
An interesting Asian case is Indonesia which has recognized
the PRC for more than two decades. Following the decimation of
the Parti Kommunis Indonesia in 1965-66, links between Jakarta
and Taipei began to evolve. Trade climbed from a total of $100,000

32. China Post, November 25, 1974.
33. China Yearbook, 1974 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1974), p. 356; and
China Yearbook, 1975 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1975), p. 356.
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in 1963 to $345.2 million in 1975. 34 The largest trade increase
(78.6%) occurred between 1972-73. Most ROC contracts in Indonesia are handled through the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.
Figures on private ROC business investment in Indonesia are
difficult to secure, but are substantial. Many of these investments
are joint efforts with Indonesian military/business elites. This
latter transnational movement of funds and ventures is a factor
which has led some elements in the present Indonesian leaderships to oppose reopening ties with Peking, though formally
Jakarta still recognizes the PRC.
Japan recognized the PRC in September 1972. Within two
months, Taipei and Tokyo staffed organizations in the opposite
capitals which were responsible for practically the identical work
previously handled through the embassies. Taiwan opened the
Association of East Asian Relations in Tokyo and Japan
established the Interchange Association in Taipei. Key personnel
in both organizations were either retired diplomats or diplomats
on leave. Both the total volume of trade and Japanese investment
have increased since 1972.
A 130 member Diet mission visited Taipei in October/November, 1974 to honor President Chiang Kai-shek on his
birthday. 35 A major point of discussions held then was a
resumption of air links after they had been severed in April1974.
The ROC had terminated the air pact between the two countries
eighteen months after Tokyo recognized the PRC, when the
Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira had publicly declared that
China Airlines was not "considered a carrier representing a
state." 36 Following extended negotiations, CAL air links with
Japan were formally reestablished in an agreement signed on
July 9, 1975. JAL has established a 100% owned subsidiary, Japan
Asia Airways, which will be the Japanese airline on the
Tokyo/Taipei route. The action which ultimately led to the
resumption of flights was Foreign Minister Miyazawa's statement

34. Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Mfairs, Foreign Trade
Development in the Republic of China, 1974, pp. 21-22; and China Post, January
13, 1976. Taiwan had a $9.6 million favorable trade balance with Indonesia in
1975.
35. The bulk of the mission was from the pro-ROC Dietmen's Association for
Sino-Japanese Relations, which has over 100 members from the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party.
36. New York Times, April 21, 1974.
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that the Nationalist flag is regarded as a national flag by those
countries recognizing the ROC. 37
The Japanese case is the most notable example of linkages
being sustained despite a political rupture which a few years ago
would have led to opposite results. Similar arrangements have
been made with the Philippines and Thailand. Taiwan's energetic
foreign relations, which include the active participation of
government departments such as the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs, Economic Affairs, and Education, as well as many
private groups, has been remarkably successful to date. Taiwan is
not internationally isolated despite diplomatic setbacks which
only a few years ago might have led to an inevitable and
progressive political deterioration.

Taipei/Peking Relations
With some degree of regularity, Peking announces its
determination to "liberate Taiwan." One of the more recent
announcements was delivered at the first session of the Fourth
National People's Congress by Chou En-lai in January 1975 when
he spoke of "the noble aim of liberating Taiwan and unifying the
motherland." 38
Pressure on Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC follows an ebb
and flow process. Early 1973 saw some pressure on Taipei to work
out a modus vivendi with Peking. General Fu Tso-yi, former
Nationalist commander of Peking, urged the Kuomintang to
"come together and talk."
If you are not prepared to enter into formal talks right
away, then send some people to the mainland openly or
secretly, to have a look and visit relatives and friends. You
can rest assured that the PRC government will keep the
matter secret, keep its word and guarantee your safety and
freedom to come and go. 39
The ROC rejected the invitation out of hand, but its officials
must always be alert to political and cultural appeals from the
mainland. Offers of autonomy and the right to retain Taiwan's
37. South China Morning Post, July 12, 1975. Peking is most unhappy about
the resumptif'- rf flights. An important consideration in Tokyo was the fact that
JAL is sufferin6 financially. For the first time in its twelve-year existence, JAL
experienced a deficit in 1974 ($143 million), the year Taipei terminated the
profitable CAL/JAL flights. Ibid., July 13, 1975.
38. Peking Review, XVIII:4 (January 24, 1975), p. 25.
39. Straits Times, March 2, 1973.
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socio-economic system can sometimes elicit a sympathetic
interest. A statement delivered in 1973 to government officials by
a Ministry of Defense official is one example of the effort by ROC
officials to educate middle-level government people:
... there are other leftists who have gone even a step
further in following the words of Chou En-lai, by spouting off
conditions for "unification" such as "Taiwan can be made a
special autonomous region, be exempt from taxes a few years,
and its industry and business allowed to operate, with a
guarantee that present living conditions can be maintained."
This is the tune harped on by those off-key Chicom
mouthpieces. Look at the autonomous regions on· the
mainland. Aren't they good examples? And what about that
guarantee to continue business and industry. Look at what
happened to "national capitalists" who remained on the
mainland after the Chinese Communist takeover. 40
Since 1973 there has been an ebb in pressures to enter into
negotiations. ROC officials were obviously relieved in late 1974 by
earlier statements the late Chou En-lai had made at least twice to
visiting Japanese delegations when he commented that the
"Taiwan question" probably would not be settled by his generation of leaders. 41 Logically this is realistic because the historical
enmities between present Nationalist and Communist leaders
preclude meaningful preliminary negotiations. Moreover, there is
no reason for the ROC to want any form of affiliation with the
mainland in the foreseeable future.
The late Chou En-lai and those who support his policies
believe that a period of long waiting is preferable to a two-China
compromise. American officials reported little direct pressure on
the U.S. over this question through late 1974. The PRC appears to
be more concerned with some form of stability in Asia, a
continued American presence, and a more activist effort to counter
Soviet activities in Asia. Activation of the Taiwan issue could be
dysfunctional in terms of these goals, At the same time, the PRC

40. Ministry of Defense statement, March 1973, mimeographed.
41. Senator Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii), who visited both the PRC and the
ROC, reported a similar statement by Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua who
said that "maybe a hundred years" would pass before a relationship between the
PRC and the ROC occurred. Congressional Record, 120:164 (November 24, 1974), p.
519956.
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fears Soviet-ROC contacts and currently emphasizes the peaceful
unification of Taiwan and the mainland. 42
CONCLUSION

Through early 1974, PRC pressures on the U.S. to recognize
Peking were restrained. Our present de facto and not always clear
two-China policy could be subject to dramatic shifts following the
1976 presidential election. Some form of "normalization" with
Peking will continue, but it would be unfortunate if the U.S.
severed diplomatic ties with the ROC. Taiwan's foreign policy has
been innovative and effective. Extensive relations between
Taiwan and the United States have been beneficial to both
countries. To break diplomatic ties with Taipei now would undermine the ROC's foreign policy and reveal an unrealistic American
aloofness to a stabilizing presence in the Pacific Basin.
Taiwan is a nation heavily dependent on international
transactions. It has been skillful and adept at surviving
diplomatic setbacks dating back to 1970. Despite its multitudinous
international ties and interests, there is an inward looking
psychological orientation emerging. This in part results from the
precarious international economic situation and a desire not to be
excessively dependent on fluctuations in the international
economy. ROC officials hope to reduce the annual increase in
foreign trade from the 20% average between 1968-74 to 12% in the
coming years. Also present in Taiwan is a sense of nationbuilding and a growing interest in domestic matters which are
distinguishable from international/domestic problems. Official
statements using the term "bastion" imply that overriding
concerns are not what they might have been 30 years ago or what
they will be 50 years from now. Speaking before the Kuomintang
Central Committee in November 1974, Premier Chiang Ching kuo
summarized the guidelines formulated at various meetings of the
party Congress and Central Committee. The first point listed was:
"Consolidating the bastion of national revival in Taiwan,
Penghu, Kinmen and making models of these places." 4 :J
42. Harold Hinton interprets passage of four Soviet naval vessels through the
Taiwan Straits on May 12, 1973, two days before David Bruce arrived in Peking as
Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, as a suggestion "that the developing relationship
between the L ted States and the People's Republic of China might be countered
by one between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China." Harold C. Hinton,
Three and a Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1975), p. 110. No reference to this naval passage appeared in the
New York Times of the period.
43. China Post, November 25, 1974.
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Taiwan's diplomacy and domestic developments during the
1970s have been more successful than many might have thought
possible. 44 It has withstood the Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger visits
to the PRC. Taiwan's international relations have helped to
provide the government and the political system with the
confidence and the capacity to confront and solve problems, to
adjust consciously political strategy to attain objectives, and to
survive. The success of its international relations is principally
the result of imaginative policies pursued by ROC officials over
the past several years. These efforts would be inhibited by an
American diplomatic shift involving the formal recognition of
Peking, which would not serve to sustain and protect American
interests in the Pacific Basin.

44. On March 9, 1977, the Ministry of Foreign Mfairs of Ecuador announced
that the ROC would set up a commercial office in Quito. The office will also handle
consular affairs. News from China, p. 77-215 (March, 1977).

